媒体报道、薪酬辩护与盈余管理方式选择  

Media Coverage,Compensation Justification and Earnings Management Methods

作　　者：张玮倩[1] 乔明哲[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,上海201620 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2015年第5期98-107,159-160,共10页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"制度多元性与新企业合法性威胁形式及管理机制研究"(71272217);上海市科研创新重点项目"基于公司创业投资的开放式创新及其管理策略研究"(14ZS147);上海市2014高校青年教师培养资助计划"媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理作用研究"

摘　　要：本文基于薪酬辩护的视角探究媒体报道对高管薪酬的监督影响作用,利用2007-2014报纸媒体对上市公司高管薪酬的新闻报道研究发现：被媒体报道的企业高管会通过提升薪酬—业绩敏感性为自身薪酬进行辩护;媒体报道后,企业高管会利用盈余管理达到薪酬辩护的目的,并且相较于真实活动盈余管理方式,被媒体报道的企业更倾向于采用应计制盈余管理方式进行薪酬辩护。本文的研究厘清了外部条件制约下（媒体监督）高管薪酬与企业业绩的互动机理,同时为我国企业设计合理有效的高管薪酬激励契约提供了有价值的参考。From the perspective of compensation justification,this paper investigates the impact of media coverage on managers' compensation using listed companies' media and financial data during2007-2009.The results show that media coverage improves the positive relationship between compensation and performance,which meets the purpose of compensation justification.For the purpose of compensation justification,managers may do some earnings management,and also,they may choose the method of earnings management.Compared to real earnings management,managers intend to choose accrual-based earnings management.Under the media coverage,this paper makes the interactive mechanism between compensation and performance clearly,and provides some advices for listed companies' managers' compensation.

关 键 词：媒体报道 薪酬辩护 应计制盈余管理 真实活动盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]