税收收入中性约束下最优环境税率研究  

A Study on Optimal Environmental Tax Rate under the Revenue-Neutral Constraint

作　　者：李香菊[1] 赵娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2015年第5期103-107,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(14BJY168)

摘　　要：通过构建完全垄断企业与政府的两阶段博弈模型,对政府如何制定最优环境税率,实现税收收入中性约束下社会福利最大化及企业利润最大化问题进行了分析。研究发现:在一定的条件下,环境税率和其他税率越高,企业产出水平和排污量越低;当政府的税收收入较少时,环境税率与排污的边际损害程度呈现倒U型;而当政府税收收入较高时,环境税率随着排污的边际损害程度的提高而增加。据此提出环境税改革的建议:一是采取有差别的环境税率;二是将污染物排放的边际损害控制在一定范围内;三是适时调整环境税税率,并同时辅之以相对应的配套改革措施。The paper discusses on how to develop the optimal environmental tax to contribute to social welfare maximization under the revenue-neutral constraint, and how to determine the en- terprise optimal output to satisfy their own profit maximization by building a two-stage game model of monopoly industry and the government. The results indicate： environmental tax rate and other tax rates were negatively related to enterprise output and abatement; When tax revenue is lower, the relationship of environmental tax rate and the degree of severity of environmental damage is inverted U-shaped. When tax revenue is higher, environmental tax rate has positive correlation with the degree of severity of environmental damage. Therefore, further adjustment and reform of the environmental tax policy must be carried out in three aspects： firstly, to implement different environmental tax rate in different area; secondly, to control the severity degree of environmental damage in a certain scope; and thirdly, to adjust the environmental tax rate properly and to take some supplementary measures at the same time.

关 键 词：税收 收入中性 环境税率 垄断企业 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]