地方国有企业间异地并购的动态博弈分析——一个财政竞争的视角  

The Dynamic Game Analysis of Inter-Province Mergers between Local State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：王守义[1] 

机构地区：[1]云南大学经济学院,云南昆明650091

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2015年第9期18-22,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：云南省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(QN2014020)

摘　　要：国有企业和私有企业(公私)之间的并购与融合被认为是新一轮国资国企改革的重头戏,但地方政府的保护主义等干预行为严重阻碍了公私并购的成功,而地方国有企业之间的异地并购经常被认为是相比公私并购更易被突破的一环,但地方政府在面临地方国有企业之间并购时存在着复杂的动态博弈,并购行为能否达成存在争议。文章将构建四个参与主体的三阶段动态博弈模型来分析在存在财政竞争压力和经济外部性可以得到控制的条件下,这种并购行为可以达成,博弈可以得到均衡解,同时文章还分析了博弈无解的情况。The mergers and fusion between the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises（public and private） is considered the key of a new round of reform, but the local government protectionism has seriously hindered the public and private mergers and acquisitions, and mergers between local state-owned enterprises in different places is often considered to be easier than a public-private merger. However, there is a complex dynamic game when the local government faces the mergers and acquisitions between the local state- owned enterprises, there have been disputes about whether mergers and acquisitions can reach consensus. This paper will study the merger behavior that can be reached by constructing four players in the three stage dynamic game model to analyze the existing fiscal competition and economic externalities that can be obtained under controlled conditions and also the game equilibrium solution is obtained.

关 键 词：地方政府 地方国有企业 异地并购 博弈分析 财政竞争 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]