管理层持股激励与企业技术创新  

Managerial Ownership Incentive and Corporate Innovation

作　　者：陈金勇[1] 汤湘希[2] 孙建波[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖北大学商学院,武汉430062 [2]中南财经政法大学会计学院,武汉430073

出　　处：《软科学》2015年第9期29-33,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072166);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(13JJD630012);湖北大学青年科学基金项目(098383)

摘　　要：以管理层是否持股及持股结构差异为切入点,考察了管理层持股结构对企业创新投入、创新产出、创新效率的影响。研究结果表明:(1)与管理层未持股的企业相比,管理层持股的上市企业能够增加研发投入、获得更多创新产出并能显著提高创新效率;(2)管理层持股比例与企业技术创新活动呈现倒U型动态特征,随着管理层持股比例增加到一定范围,影响效应由激励效应转变为堑沟效应,同时企业终极控制人性质的不同与股权集中度的高低,会导致管理层持股与企业技术创新绩效的显著性差异。针对企业创新活动的周期性特质,采用的所有模型均考虑时滞或预期因素,检验结论成立。This paper examines the impact of managerial ownership structure on corporate innovation input,output and the efficiency of innovation from the perspective that whether or not executives hold stocks and the difference of shareholding ratio. Result shows that,firstly,compared with companies without managerial ownership,firms with managerial ownership show higher innovation input and output,and have significantly higher innovation efficiency; secondly,being different with previous researches,executive shareholding ratio and corporate innovation activities picture an inverted U-shaped curve. As the executive shareholding ratio increases to a certain range,incentive effects gradually change to entrenchment effects,also,the nature of ultimate controlling shareholders and ownership concentration has a significant impact on managerial shareholding and corporate innovation; thirdly,for the periodicity of corporate innovation activities,impacts of time lags and expectational factors have already been taken into account in the models with the support form the test results.

关 键 词：管理层持股激励 技术创新绩效 创新效率 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F272[经济管理—国民经济]