基于博弈论的印染工业园区清洁生产激励机制研究  

Game-theory based incentive mechanism towards cleaner production of printing and dyeing industrial park

作　　者：张芸 汪文强 陶佳慧 李金花 

机构地区：[1]工业生态与环境工程教育部重点实验室大连理工大学环境学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《辽宁师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第3期381-386,共6页Journal of Liaoning Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家水体污染控制与治理科技重大专项(2012ZX07202-001)

摘　　要：将博弈论引入清洁生产激励机制设计.在对印染工业园区清洁生产成本、效益、政府监管成本等进行分析和评价的基础上,通过博弈矩阵分析,建立纳什均衡条件的计算模型,定性分析印染工业园区印染企业和政府的博弈关系.以中国东北某印染工业园区为案例进行清洁生产激励机制分析,研究结果表明,推进园区清洁生产最直接的激励方法是通过提供财政补贴来平衡政府与企业的博弈关系,案例的最适补贴比例为31.6%.This study introduces game-theory into the design of the incentive mechanism towards cleaner production of printing and dyeing industrial park.Based on the analysis and evaluation of the cleaner production cost,benefit,government supervision cost,etc.,the calculation model of Nash equilibrium is constructed by applying the game matrix for qualitative analysis of the game relationship between the government and the enterprises in printing and dyeing industrial park.A printing and dyeing industrial park in northeast China is used as a case study for the incentive mechanism analysis.The results show that the most direct incentive policy towards cleaner production in printing and dyeing industrial park is to balance the game relationship between the government and the enterprises by providing financial subsidies,and in the case study of this paper the optimal subsidy should be 31.6%.

关 键 词：博弈论 印染行业 清洁生产 激励机制 

分 类 号：X38[环境科学与工程—环境工程]