批发价格契约下供应链公平偏好动态演进分析  

The Dynamic Evolution Analysis on Fairness Concern of Supply Chain Under Wholesale Price Contract

作　　者：覃燕红[1] 魏光兴[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054 [2]重庆交通大学管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《预测》2015年第5期48-54,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：重庆市教委科学技术研究资助项目(KJ1400909);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102165)

摘　　要：本文根据零售商理性程度与公平偏好信息对称与否,将零供博弈分为5个阶段,即:(1)零售商不关注公平且信息对称;(2)供应商完全不知道零售商公平偏好行为;(3)供应商低估零售商公平偏好程度;(4)供应商高估零售商公平偏好程度;(5)供应商准确识别零售商公平偏好程度。在对各个阶段比较分析基础上提出了管理启示:对于供应商而言,不能忽视零售商的公平偏好,应选择公平偏好强度较弱的零售商合作,且应尽量隐瞒自身实际生产成本;对于零售商而言,应努力让供应商了解自身的公平偏好特征,应选择公平偏好较强的供应商合作,且应努力准确估计供应商生产成本。According to the rationality degree of retailer and information completeness of fairness concern, the supplier-retailer transaction process can be divided into five game stages, i. e. （1）The retailer is perfectly rational and information is common to each other;（2）The supplier do not know the retailer’s fairness concern at all;（3）The supplier underesti-mate the retailer’s fairness concern;（4）The supplier overestimate the retailer’s fairness concern;（5）The supplier esti-mate the retailer’ s fairness concern exactly. We propose some management insights. For supplier, it should not neglect the retailer’ s fairness concern, should choose the retailer with weaker fairness concern and should conceal its real production cost. For retailer, it should make supplier aware of its fairness concern, should choose the supplier who give consideration to channel fairness and should endeavour to estimate the production cost and inform supplier of the estimation.

关 键 词：批发价格契约 公平偏好 行为博弈 有限理性 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]