信息不对称时基于过度自信代理人的工资契约研究  

Research on Wage Contract Based on the Overconfident Agent Under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：徐玉发[1] 郭金森[2] 沈乐平[1] 刘哲睿[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640 [2]河南师范大学商学院,河南新乡453007

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2015年第17期40-47,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：非对称信息条件下建立了具有过度自信代理人的委托代理模型.基于模型讨论了代理人过度自信行为对其自身努力水平及委托人利润的影响,得出:与对称信息情形相比,信息不对称条件下,代理人的努力程度更低,委托人利润也会减少.代理人的过度自信特征能降低信息不对称对委托人的不利影响,因而后者更愿意选择过度自信程度高的代理人合作.The researches start from how the overconfidence of agent could affect its effort and the profit of principal under information asymmetry in the principal-agent model. Degree of the effort of agent and the profit of principal under information asymmetry are less than the case under information symmetry. The difference is inversely proportional to the overcon- fidence level of agent. The overconfidence of agent has a positive value of information, which can reduce the adverse effects of asymmetric information. The agent is preferred for a higher degree of overconfidence.

关 键 词：公司治理 信息不对称 过度自信 委托代理 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济] F224[经济管理—国民经济]