不对称信息下制造商契约设计  

THE MANUFACTURER CONTRACT DESIGN WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

作　　者：王学武[1] 藏晓鑫 马文杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北电力大学理学院,吉林132012

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2015年第8期958-964,共7页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：吉林省科学技术厅项目(201115182)资助课题

摘　　要：考虑由制造商和销售人员组成的供应链,其中市场需求依赖于制造商的货物质量,销售人员的努力以及市场的随机因素,建立由制造商起主导作用的数学模型.制造商通过制定产品质量,工资契约,销售价格来最大化自己的利润.销售人员针对不同质量的货物决定相应努力水平以最大化自己的利润.关于销售人员的努力水平在对称信息及不对称信息情形下,制造商运用激励相容原理设计最优契约,得到销售价格,产品质量及销售提成之间的关系.结果表明,信息对称情形下,销售人员的努力水平与产品的质量成正比.信息不对称情形下,类型为H(很努力)的销售人员的固定收入随类型为L(一般努力)的销售人员的销售提成增大而增加.This paper considers the supply chain by the manufacturer and sales staff where demand depends on the manufacturer-chosen quality of the product, the sales staff effort and random factors in the market. The manufacturer aims to establish the mathematical model to maximize his profit by means of formulating product quality, wage contract, and sales price. The sales staff decide her effort lelevs against different product quality. In the case of symmetric information and asymmetric information on the efforts of the sales staff, manufacturers use the incentive compatibility principle to design the optimal contract, and derives the relationship of the sales price, the product quality and the sales commissions. The result shows that, in the symmetric information case, the level of the efforts of the sales staff and product is proportional to the product quality; in the asymmetric information case, the fixed income of the sales staff with the type-H （work hard） increases in the sales staff sales commissons with the type-L （general efforts）.

关 键 词：委托代理 契约设计 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]