股权激励、高管权力与内部控制  

Equity Incentive,Top-management Power and Internal Control

作　　者：张萍[1] 闵权凤 徐巍[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093 [2]江西外语外贸职业学院会计系,江西南昌330025

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2015年第10期44-51,共8页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402068)

摘　　要：文章以2006-2013年我国A股上市公司为样本,试图从影响内部控制的"隐性"因素入手,探讨实施股权激励是否能够加强高管提高内部控制有效性的动机,并分析高管权力对股权激励效果的影响。研究发现:股权激励与内部控制质量之间呈显著的正相关关系,具体为实施股权激励后,公司内部控制质量有所提高;且激励程度越高,内部控制质量越好;相较于股票期权的形式,限制性股票激励更能够促进内部控制质量的提高。进一步研究发现:实施股权激励后,较大的高管权力强化了股权激励对内部控制的治理效果。Taking A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2013 as samples, the paper attempts to start from the ＇recessive＇ factors that ＇affect internal control, explores whether the implementation of equity incentive can strengthen the motivation of top-management to improve the effectiveness of internal control, and analyzes the impact of top-management power on equity incentive. The study shows that equity incentive has a significant positive impact on internal control quality. Specifically, the internal control quality is improved ＇after the implementation of equity incentive. The higher the level of equi- ty incentive, the better the quality of internal control. Compared to the fornl of stock options, the restricted stock incentive can promote more improvement of the quality of internal control. Further study finds that the larger top-management power strengthens the governance effect of equity incentive on internal control after the implementation of equity incentive.

关 键 词：股权激励 内部控制 高管权力 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] R276.6[经济管理—国民经济]