“农超对接”水产品供应链质量风险控制委托代理模型  

Quality Risk Control for“Farming-Supermarket Docking”Aquatic Supply Chain Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：颜波[1] 石平[1] 张华英[1] 石松[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学经济与贸易学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《系统工程》2015年第8期8-16,共9页Systems Engineering

基　　金：专业镇中小微企业服务平台建设项目(2012B040500026/2013B040500007);农业科技成果转化资金重点项目(2013GB2E000353);广东省软科学研究计划项目(2013B070206013);促进科技服务业发展计划项目(2013B040200057)

摘　　要：以"农超对接"水产品供应链为研究对象,结合"农超对接"水产品供应链的运作流程,利用委托-代理理论,构建水产品供应链质量风险控制协调模型。针对供应链上、下游企业资金充足与否4种情况,采用库恩塔克条件(KKT),讨论最佳协作状态下收益、质量保障水平及投资规模之间的关系。研究表明:无论是养殖基地还是超市,资金充足时的质量保障水平和收益均大于不足时的收益;企业的质量保障水平与自身销售价格、销售地质量检测水平、协同企业质量保障水平及产品新鲜度敏感系数呈正相关,与价格敏感系数呈负相关。基于模型分析结果,提出"农超对接"水产品供应链质量风险控制策略。Considering the quality factors of＂Farming-Supermarket Docking＂aquatic supply chain,this paper constructs the supply chain quality risk control coordination model based on the principal-agent theory.The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker（KKT）is used to analyze the relationship among the revenue,the best level of quality assurance,and the investment scale under different capital position.The results show that the income and quality level of breeding base and supermarket are greater than the low investment funds.The level of quality assurance positively correlates with its own sales prices,the level of sales quality testing,the level of quality assurance of collaborative enterprises,the product freshness sensitive coefficient and a single batch of product sales time.But it negatively correlates with price-sensitive.Finally,this paper puts forward quality control strategy for＂Farming-Supermarket Docking＂aquatic supply chain according to the conclusions.

关 键 词：水产品供应链 农超对接 供应链质量风险 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]