美德为何应得  

The Reasons of Desert for Virtue

作　　者：张增船[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系

出　　处：《理论与现代化》2015年第5期59-65,共7页Theory and Modernization

基　　金：2012年国家社会科学基金重大项目"社会转型中的公民道德建设工程研究";项目编号:12&ZD007

摘　　要：好人应得好报,有德之人配享幸福的信念充斥在我们的道德生活中。在应得理论的框架中,这种信念可转化为有德之人应得某种益处的信念。这种信念遭到了两种有力的反驳,认为它在实际生活中无法发挥作用或者是自欺欺人。但它也得到了两种有力的支持,认为它产生于感激债务的原则或者是人的内在价值实现的必然要求。在浅见的意义上,感激债务的原则是有效的,但在更深的意义上,这种信念根植于人们对于人的内在价值或人格价值的反思。The faith that a good man deserves positive reward and the virtuous people deserve the well-being is entrenched our moral life. The faith can be translated into that a good man deserves some goods within the framework of the desert theory. The faith has been refused by two strong arguments that it will not be practical or self-defeating, while it has been also accepted by another strong argument that it will be grounded in the debts of gratitude. At the first glance, the debt of gratitude is reasonable; but in a deeper sense, it is rooted in the intrinsic value of person.

关 键 词：美德 应得 感激债务 内在价值 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]