交叉所有权、国有股最优比重与混合所有制经济发展  

Cross-ownership,the Optimal Proportion of State-owned Shares and the Mixed Ownership Economy Development

作　　者：陈俊龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学秦皇岛分校经济学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《软科学》2015年第10期24-28,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD022);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(12JJD790028);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC790010);河北省社会科学基金项目(HB15YJ116);河北省社会科学发展研究项目(2015040202)

摘　　要：通过构建由国有企业及私有企业组成的混合双寡头垄断模型,研究交叉所有权与国有股最优比重之间的相互作用。研究发现:交叉所有权与政府的国有股比重决策具有相互作用,共同对社会福利产生影响;只有在国有股比重足够低的情况下,交叉所有权安排对私有企业才是有利可图的;在均衡状态下,不存在私有企业对国有企业的交叉所有权安排;在国有企业与私有企业效率差距超过一定水平的情况下,交叉所有权安排存在的可能性对国有股最优比重产生影响。This paper constructs a mixed duopoly model composed by the state-owned enterprise and private enterprise,and the effects of cross-ownership on optimal nationalization,and vice-versa,in mixed duopoly. Result shows that cross-ownership and the proportion of state-owned shares influence each other and the social welfare. Cross-ownership is profitable to the private firm only when the level of nationalization of the public firm is sufficiently low. In equilibrium,cross-ownership does not take place. The cross-ownership influences the optimal level of nationalization,if the efficiency gap between the two firms is larger than a critical level.

关 键 词：交叉所有权 国有股比重 混合所有制经济 双寡头垄断 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]