内部控制质量、产权性质与企业非效率投资——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证研究  

The Quality of Internal Control,Property Right and Corporate Inefficiency Investment:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：王治[1] 张皎洁[1] 郑琦[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,长沙410114

出　　处：《管理评论》2015年第9期95-107,共13页Management Review

基　　金：湖南省教育厅重点项目(14A008);现代服务业发展与湖南新型城镇化协同创新中心资助项目;湖南省普通高等学校哲学社会科学重点研究基地科研项目(11jqkf07);湖南省企业战略管理与投资决策研究基地开放基金项目(10jdyb09)

摘　　要：内部控制作为提高公司治理水平和保护投资者利益的重要手段,能否起到抑制我国上市公司非效率投资的作用?是否受到企业产权性质的影响?本文基于2007-2012年间1010家我国上市公司面板数据,对不同产权性质下内部控制质量对企业非效率投资的影响及其差异进行了实证研究,研究结果表明:高质量内部控制能够降低企业现金流量过度投资与投资不足的非效率投资现象,并且民营企业高质量内部控制抑制企业非效率投资行为的效果要好于国有企业,地方国企的高质量内部控制抑制企业非效率投资行为的效果要好于中央国企。上述结论为从完善我国企业产权制度出发建设企业内部控制制度提供了依据。Whether the internal control,as an important means to improve corporate governance and to protect the interests of the investors,can play a role in restraining the inefficiency investment of the listing companies in China？ Whether or not is it affected by the enterprise property rights？ This paper examines the association among the quality of internal control,property rights and investment efficiency based on a sample of Chinese listed companies between 2007 and 2012. The main findings can be summarized as follows. First,high quality internal controls can reduce underinvestment and overinvestment associated with free cash flow. Second,high quality internal controls are more pronounced for private enterprise than state-owned enterprises. Third,among state-owned enterprises,the effect of high quality internal controls on reduction in underinvestment is stronger for local state-owned enterprises than for central state-owned enterprises. The above findings provide further insight on construction of the internal control system of enterprise from the improvement of the enterprise property rights system in China.

关 键 词：内部控制质量 产权性质 非效率投资 自由现金流 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]