公司控制权、资本流动性与并购绩效——基于交互视角的中国上市公司股权收购的研究  被引量:4

CORPORATE CONTROL,CAPITAL LIQUIDITY AND MERGER & ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE——On the Equity Acquisition of China Listed Companies from Interactive Perspective

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作  者:周瑜胜[1] 宋光辉[2] 

机构地区:[1]广东外语外贸大学商学院 [2]华南理工大学工商管理学院

出  处:《经济理论与经济管理》2015年第10期67-87,共21页Economic Theory and Business Management

基  金:国家社科基金项目(12CJY006);教育部人文社科基金规划项目(10YJA630131)的资助

摘  要:现有文献分别考察了公司内部治理机制和外部资本市场对并购绩效的影响,甚少考虑外部资本市场与内部治理特征内生性的影响,这会使研究结论产生偏差。本文将上述两者结合起来,在交互的视角下,首先运用夏普里(Shapley)值分解法分析了控制权与流动性各自对并购绩效的贡献,进一步分析了控制权与流动性之间的相互影响,并设计了分位数分组回归模型,研究在流动性调整下控制权的并购绩效效应。本文研究表明,流动性对公司控制权的并购绩效产生了比较明显的调整,货币市场流动性高时控制权并购绩效低;股票市场流动性高时控制权并购绩效显著;而个股流动性对控制权的并购绩效调整不明显。Previous papers studied the effect of liquidity and corporate control on M&A performance respectively,without considering the endogenous influence between corporate control and capital market liquidity,which will make the conclusions biased.This research combines the two class factors from interactive perspective,considers the mutual influence between control rights and the liquidity,and analyzes the contribution of each of the control variables and liquidity variables to M&A performance with using Shapley value decomposition.This paper designs a multivariable quintile regression model which studies the impact of corporate control on M&A performance adjusted by liquidity.The research shows that liquidity has obvious influence on the relation between M&A performance and control right.When money market liquidity is higher,the effect of control on M&A performance is lower;when the stock market liquidity is higher,the effect of control on M&A performance is more significant positively.The adjustment effect of stock liquidity exerted on the relation between M&A performance and corporate control is not obvious.

关 键 词:控制权 流动性 交互关系 并购绩效 夏普里值分解 

分 类 号:F275[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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