农村金融机构发展中的主体行为分析及激励机制构建  

The Analysis of the Principal Parts' Behavior and the Construction of the Incentive Mechanism in Developing the Rural Financial Institutions

作　　者：于乃书[1] 刘馨阳[2] 刘丹 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学经济学院金融系 [2]吉林省邮政公司金融业务局 [3]中国社会科学研究院数量金融与技术金融研究所

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2015年第10期43-51,共9页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：吉林省科技厅软科学研究项目"吉林省新型农村金融机构支持性政策研究"(项目编号:20140418082FG);吉林大学基本科研业务费项目(项目编号:2010JC039)

摘　　要：发展农村金融机构促进农村经济进步是中国新农村建设的重要内容,而发展农村金融机构的重要手段就是激励机制的建立。笔者首先对农村金融机构、政府、农户这三种主体的相互行为进行了分析:在研究了农村金融机构与政府之间的作用关系和博弈关系后,理论上提出如何使得政策激励得以改进;在研究了农村金融机构与农户之间的博弈关系之后,指出在存在信用约束下的策略组合最优;对农村金融机构自身的行为偏好研究中指出了在其经济人前提下所导致的实际目标与服务宗旨的背离。其次对上述各主体间现存的激励不相容问题进行了分析。最后对三种主体之间的激励机制的构建提出了若干较具实际意义的对策建议。The establishment of the incentive mechanism is a main method in developing the rural financial institutions which are important to new rural by promoting the rural economy in China. This paper firstly analyses the behavior features among the rural financial institutions,the government and the countryside households through the view of game theory. We provide a theoretical way to enhance the motivation after the research of the interaction between the government and the rural financial institutions. Furthermore,we find out that the strategy combination between the rural financial institutions and the farmers is optimal under the condition of credit constraints. Besides,the research of the rural financial institutions themselves suggests that the final goals they pursuit deviate from their initial aim. Secondly,we analyze the incentive-incompatibility problems among the three principal parts. Finally,some practical suggestions are presented to construct the incentive mechanism.

关 键 词：农村金融机构 激励机制 激励不相容 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]