政府干预、外部投资与企业自主创新——基于信号传递博弈模型  

Government Intervention,External Investment and Business Independent Innovation—Based on Signaling Games Model

作　　者：李小静[1,2] 傅利平[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院博士后流动站,北京100871 [2]中国华融资产管理股份有限公司博士后科研工作站,北京100033 [3]天津大学管理与经济学部//公共资源研究中心,天津300072

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第20期1-6,共6页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学规划重点项目"战略性新兴产业创新发展面临的问题及政策研究--以天津市滨海新区为例"(TJGL13-003)

摘　　要：针对我国企业自主创新普遍面临着融资约束和研发投入不足的问题,运用信号传递模型,对政府干预、外部投资与企业自主创新的主体行为进行研究。结果显示:致力于基础建设和创新开发的政府都会选择对辖区内企业实施高干预;企业接收到信号会选择实施创新开发活动,外部投资者会采取投资行为,其参与与否对最终均衡结构产生显著影响;最终的均衡与企业创新成功的概率、外部投资活动成功的概率及收益有关。In view of the independent innovation generally facing financial constraints and shortage of RD investment,by utilizing signal transmission model,the government intervention,external investment,and the main body of enterprise independent innovation behavior were studied. The results showed that government dedicating to the development of infrastructure and innovation will choose high intervention to enterprises within their respective jurisdictions implement; enterprises will choose to implement innovative development activities; outside investors will take investment behavior,and whether they participate in it has a significant impact on final balance structure; the ultimate equilibrium and the probability of successful enterprise innovation are related to the probability of successful external investment activities and benefits.

关 键 词：自主创新 政府干预 外部投资 信号传递博弈模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]