中国轿车制造商纵向限制机理与对策  

作　　者：朱洪瑞 朱轶斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]华北理工大学经济学院 [2]天津财经大学商学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2015年第10期135-140,共6页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：河北省科技厅项目"河北省科技创新引领经济发展的评价机制及对策研究"(批准号:15457611D);河北省社会科学基金项目"河北省经济新常态下加快构建推动金融与科技融合的动力体系研究"(批准号:HB15YJ031)

摘　　要：本文基于合作博弈的视角,在归纳总结中国轿车制造商纵向限制特征的基础上,探究了其强势地位形成的根源及纵向限制的内在机理;构建了轿车制造商与经销商讨价还价模型,得出了如下重要结论:轿车制造商与经销商处于既合作又冲突的关系之中,制造商凭借强大的谈判力占有较大份额的合作剩余;由于专用性资产具有"锁定效应",对经销商形成了较高的"退出壁垒",使制造商可以对经销商进行"敲竹杠"。反垄断机构应从"功能剥离"、规制合约、建立退出补偿机制、规制专用性资产投资行为等方面入手采取措施,进行制度改进。Under the perspective of cooperative game, this paper has revealed the sources of formation of a strong position to the car manufacturer in China and the internal mechanism by which the manufacturer controls the behavior of the dealer powerful- ly, based on summarizing the properties of the vertical restraints of the manufacturer in China. Additionally, the paper has come to some important conclusions through constructing a bargaining model which represents the relationship between manufacturer and dealer. Firstly, the manufacturer and the dealer are in the relationship of both cooperation and conflict, and the former gains major portion of the cooperation surplus. Secondly, the manufacturer brings the deal holding amount of specific assets into ＂lock-in＂ effect easily mainly through increasing the exit barrier for the latter. This is the ＂hold up problem＂ resulted from assets specificity and caused by the manufacturer. Finally, the antimonopoly institution should take some relevant measures mainly focusing on function divestiture, contract regulation, establishment of compensation mechanism to exit, regulation of investment behavior of specific assets and so on.

关 键 词：轿车制造商 纵向限制 讨价还价模型 专用性资产 制度改进 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]