民营企业官符独董履职效果的实证检验  

Can politically connected independent director of private firms perform their duties effectively?

作　　者：易玄[1] 黄姣梅[1] 谢志明[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [2]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410076

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第5期154-161,共8页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目"可再生能源全额收购的价格机制及配套政策研究"(14BJY143);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目"独立董事‘旋转门’形成机理;后果与监管策略"(13YJA790127);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目"中国制度背景下审计契约行为异化及其治理研究"(11YJC790247)

摘　　要：近年来,退职政府官员担任上市公司独立董事现象频现,引发社会热议。对退职官员担任独立董事能否有效履职、对公司绩效能否产生积极影响等问题的解答,成为剖析"官符独董"现象的关键。选取2005—2013年民营上市企业为研究对象,描述了官符独董聘任和日常履职情况,并实证分析其对公司绩效的影响,结果显示官符独董尽管领取相对高的薪酬,但并不能有效履职,因而给企业绩效带来了消极影响,且行政级别越高,消极作用越强。In the recent years, more and more retired senior officials tend to act as independent directors in private firms, which arouses heated debates in the society. It is the key to dissect whether these politically connected independent directors perform their duties effectively and whether they positively impact the performance of the firms. Taking the private listed companies during 2005-2013 as samples, the present study elaborates the employment of politically connected independent directors. The result shows that politically connected independent directors play the role of“vase director”. Although they receive relatively higher payment, they can not perform their duties effectively, and herefore bring a negative effect on the firms’ performances. Besides, the higher the administrative positions they hold, the stronger the negative effect is.

关 键 词：民营企业 官符独董 履职情况 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]