基于互惠动机的团队激励动态博弈分析  

Team Incentive Under Reciprocity in Approach of Dynamic Game

作　　者：唐瑜[1,2] 魏光兴[1] 彭京玲 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学管理学院,重庆400074 [2]四川省达州市经济与信息化委员会,四川达州635000

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2015年第10期53-59,共7页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于偏好结构和群体规范互动机理的激励机制设计"(71102165)

摘　　要：引入被传统经济学忽略了的互惠动机行为心理特征,建立团队博弈模型,以线性契约激励为基础,分别在静态博弈和动态博弈框架下分析均衡努力和均衡产出,并进行比较分析。研究发现,无论是在静态博弈还是在动态博弈下,互惠动机都会促使代理人提高努力水平,提高团队产出,而且在动态博弈下,互惠动机的作用更强。This paper developed a team model incorporating reciprocity which had been ignored by classical economics in approach of dynamic game theory,and analyzed the efforts and outputs at equilibrium on the base of linear contract incentive within the frame of static and dynamic game respectively,and hereby compared the difference. It is found that in approach of static and dynamic game,the reciprocity can increase the efforts of agents and team outputs,which both grow with the strengths of the reciprocity,while the extent under dynamic game is bigger than that under static game.

关 键 词：互惠动机 团队产出 努力水平 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]