基于合作博弈的买方抗衡势力市场绩效与卖方工艺创新强度分析  

Analysis of Impacts of Countervailing Power on Market Performance and Seller's Process Innovation Intensity Based on Cooperative Game

作　　者：安岗[1] 李凯[1] 崔哲[1] 李伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110819

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2015年第5期206-213,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"消费者偏好背景下买方抗衡势力形成机理及其影响研究"(71172150;项目负责人:李凯);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"基于纵向关系理论的供应链利益协调机制研究"(10YJC790004;项目负责人:安岗)

摘　　要：设计了由一个上游企业和两个下游企业所构成的产业链纵向关系模型,建立了纵向一体化、纵向分离且下游企业均无买方抗衡势力、以及单个下游企业具有买方抗衡势力三种情况下上游企业的工艺创新强度计算模型,分析了下游企业存在买方抗衡势力时市场中均衡的批发价格、零售价格、企业利润以及社会福利的变化,给出了相应的结论,同时也说明了"加尔布雷斯假说"在本文的结构下没有得到验证。We consider a vertical relationship model which consists of an upstream firm and two downstream firms, and construct calculation models of upstream firm＇ s process innovation intensity in three different situa- tions-vertical integration, vertical separation in which neither downstream has countervailing power, vertical separation in which only one downstream has countervailing power. By doing these, we analyse the changes of wholesale prices, retail prices, profits and social welfare in equilibrium and get corresponding conclusions, and we also show that ＂Galbraith hypothesis＂ has not been verified in the structure of this paper.

关 键 词：工艺创新强度决策 市场绩效 合作博弈 买方抗衡势力 两部收费制 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]