政策实施的动态不一致性与我国食品安全监管博弈  

Dynamic Inconsistency of Policy Implementation and Food Safety Regulation Game in China

作　　者：张云辉[1] 金慧玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学经济学院,哈尔滨150040

出　　处：《商业研究》2015年第11期1-7,共7页Commercial Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目"中国食品安全的监管与治理:基于执法选择性的博弈分析";项目编号:12YJCZH295;黑龙江省教育厅人文社科研究项目"黑龙江省水污染的选择性监管";项目编号:11552028

摘　　要：食品安全事故频繁发生直接暴露出食品安全监管体制的诸多漏洞,而政府在食品安全监管中政策实施的动态不一致性进一步加重了问题的严重性。本文通过建立一个信息不对称条件下的动态博弈模型,分析政府在食品安全监管中监管政策实施的动态不一致性导致监管力度不足的作用机理,在理论层面上解释我国普遍存在食品安全问题的成因,并通过政府声誉等变量的变化,对模型进行比较静态分析,提出提高监管力度等避免食品安全隐患的建议。Food safety accidents exposed many questions of food safety regulation system directly, and the dynamic in-consistency of policy implementation further compounded the problem. In this paper, we analyze the action mechanism of insufficient regulation strength leaded by the dynamic inconsistency of regulation implementation in food safety supervision through establishing a dynamic game model under the condition of asymmetric information, and explain the cause of com-mon food safety problems in our country at theoretical level. Then we change the variables such as the government reputa-tion in the model to make comparative static analysis, and put forward suggestions like improving the regulation strength-en and so on to avoid hidden trouble in food safety.

关 键 词：食品安全 动态不一致性 监管力度 

分 类 号：F123.16[经济管理—世界经济]