职责同构、公共教育属性与政府支出偏向——再议中国式分权和地方教育支出  

Isomorphic Responsibility,Education Attributes and Public Expenditure Deviation:Rethinking Chinese-Style Decen Tralization and Local Education Expenditure

作　　者：田志磊[1] 杨龙见[2] 袁连生[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学中国教育财政科学研究所,北京100871 [2]中央财经大学税务学院,北京100875 [3]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京100875

出　　处：《北京大学教育评论》2015年第4期123-142,187,共20页Peking University Education Review

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金特别资助(2015T80002);博士后科学基金面上资助(2014M560002)

摘　　要：中国式分权理论抓住了我国政府间关系的关键特质——政治集权下的经济分权,但是在解释地方教育供给时存在分析架构上的不足,因而未能对教育财政支出占GDP 4%的目标实现给出合理解释。本文聚焦于教育的直接提供者,在讨论公共教育的产品属性以及地市和县支出偏好的基础上,重新审视中国式分权对地方教育支出的影响。结果发现,在地市一县教育职责同构和财政分权的背景下,县级政府边际教育支出倾向递减,而在以私人物品和俱乐部性质教育供给为主的地市政府,教育支出并未呈现边际递减的倾向。21世纪初以"政策制定集权上收中央,财政支出分权下沉到县"为特征的中国式分权改革改善了地方政府的教育支出,但是也产生了一系列的新问题。Although Chinese-style decentralization theory catches the key characteristic of Chinese intergovernmental relationship,this analytical framework has defects when it is applied to explain the provision of public education.For example,it fails to explain the fact that government spending on education has reached 4%of GDP.This paper reconsiders the relationship between Chinese-style decentralization and public education spending from the perspective of the direct supplier of public education.It finds that,as local revenue increases,the proportion of budget funds allocated to education at the county level decreases while the proportion increases at the municipal level.In a centralized decision-making education finance system,although public education spending has increased through fiscal decentralization,the Chinese-style decentralization also causes a number of new problems.

关 键 词：中国式分权 职责同构 地方政府 教育支出 

分 类 号：G521[文化科学—教育学]