考虑低碳偏好和政府补贴的供应链博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Supply Chains with Low-carbon Preference and Government Subsidy

作　　者：戴发山[1] 曹江琴[1] 

机构地区：[1]三峡大学经济与管理学院,湖北宜昌443000

出　　处：《物流技术》2015年第19期156-160,248,共6页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：在低碳经济发展潮流下,研究了1个供应商、1个制造商和1个零售商构成的三级供应链结构中,如何推进供应链低碳化发展,实现低碳供应链利润最大化的问题。充分考虑了政府低碳鼓励、低碳偏好与低碳投入对低碳产品成本与需求量的影响,分别从合作与非合作两方面构建了低碳供应链三方博弈模型,利用Maple软件求解得到最优决策,并通过对比分析发现合作模式下供应链利润高于非合作模式,并且低碳偏好和政府补贴程度越高,越有利于推进供应链低碳化发展;供应链新增利润随着企业低碳努力水平的提高而增加。In this paper, we studied how to promote the low-carbon development of a three-echelon supply chain composed by one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer while still maximizing its profit. After fully considering the influence of the government low- carbon subsidy, and low carbon preference and investment on the cost and demand volume of the low- carbon product, we built the cooperative and non-cooperative model of the low-carbon supply chain tripartite game respectively, used the Maple program to obtain the optimal decision of the model, then through a comparative analysis, found that the profit of the cooperative model was higher than that of the non-cooperative model, that higher low-carbon preference and government subsidization level were conducive to the low-carbon development of the supply chain, and that the additional profit of the supply chain would increase with the low-carbon effort level of the enterprises.

关 键 词：低碳偏好 低碳补贴 三级供应链 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]