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机构地区:[1]中国计量学院经济与管理学院,浙江杭州310018
出 处:《税务与经济》2015年第6期40-44,共5页Taxation and Economy
基 金:教育部人文社会科学项目(项目编号:13YJA630093);国家质检总局科技计划项目(项目编号:2012QK367)
摘 要:食品安全一直是公众关心的热点问题,而食品安全问题的成因复杂,关系到多维要素,食品供应链中任意一环节出现问题都将导致食品安全事故的发生。在食品供应链全环节中将供应商、生产企业、销售商以及消费者作为理性经济人,从食品安全的上游企业到下游消费者,在各自主体追求最大利益的假定基础上分别建立静态博弈模型,利用博弈论模型分析查找在供应链中出现食品安全事故的诱导性因素。基于分析结论,需要有针对性地采取加大处罚力度、食品生产企业对供应商提供一定质量协助、规范食品行业价格、对消费者的合理投诉进行奖励等政策措施,以有效保证我国的食品安全。Food safety has been a hot topic among the public. But the causes of unsafe food is more complicated and many multi-dimensional factors are involved. The problems in any link of food supply chain will lead to unsafe food accidents. The suppliers,manufacturers,sellers and consumers are considered as rational economists in the links of food supply chain. In this paper,a static game model is set up on the basis of the assumption that all the economists pursue maximum profits. This model is applied to examine the accident-induced factors in food supply. The result indicates that it is necessary to strengthen the targeted penalties. In order to ensure food safety effectively in China,food production enterprises should provide suppliers with assistance and regulate prices in food industry. They still should reward consumers for their reasonable complaints.
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