政府补贴:救急还是救穷——来自亏损类公司样本的经验证据  

Government Subsidies:Relief for the Emergency or the Poor? An Empirical Evidence from Loss-making Firms

作　　者：王红建[1] 李青原[2] 刘放[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2015年第5期42-53,共12页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(N ECT-12-0432);国家自然科学基金项目(71272228)资助

摘　　要：本文以2001-2013年我国A股非金融类亏损上市公司数据为样本,重点研究政府倾向于补贴亏损较严重的企业(救穷行为)还是亏损较轻的企业(救急行为)及其经济后果,这对政府如何有效利用补贴资源帮助亏损企业实现扭亏为盈,提升巨额政府补贴资源的利用效率具有重要意义。实证检验结果发现:第一,按产权性质划分,政府对国有企业更倾向于救穷行为,而对非国有企业更倾向于救急行为;第二,按地区的政府干预程度划分,位于干预程度较高地区,政府更倾向于对国有企业进行救穷行为,对非国有企业更倾向于进行救急行为,而政府干预程度较低地区的企业,其亏损程度与政府补贴间则无显著性关系;第三,按行业的竞争性程度划分发现,政府更倾向于对垄断性行业中的国有企业进行救穷行为,对竞争性行业中的非国有企业更倾向于进行救急行为。进一步检验发现,对国有企业救穷行为有助于提升补贴价值,而对非国有企业的救急行为有助于提升补贴价值,其他补贴行为均未显著性提升公司价值。以上研究结果有助于我们更加深刻地理解我国政府对企业的补贴机理及其经济后果,从而为政府科学配置补贴资源、进一步提高补贴资源的利用效率提供理论依据。Using the data from 2001-2013 A-share non-financial loss-making firms as sample, this article investigates into the is- sue of whether the government is more likely to subsidize firms whose degree of loss is more higher （the behavior of saving firms in poverty） or lower （the behavior of the saving firms in emergency） and their economic consequences, thereby providing the empirical evidence of how the government use the resources of subsidies efficiently to help loss-making firms turn around and improve operational performance. The empirical results show that： Firstly, dividing firms by the nature of property right, this article finds that the government is more likely to save state-owned enterprises （SOEs） in poverty and save non-SOEs in emergency; Secondly, dividing firms by the degree of government intervention, this paper finds that in districts or zones with higher degree of government interven- tion, the government is more likely to save SOEs in poverty while in districts or zones with lower degree of government intervention, the government is more likely to save non-SOEs in emergency; Thirdly, dividing firms by the degree of competitiveness of industry, this paper finds that in monopoly industries, the government is more likely to save SOEs in poverty, while in competitive industries, the government is more likely to save non-SOEs in need. Further tests find that in districts or zones with lower degree of government in- tervention and monopoly industries, the behavior of saving SOEs in poverty helps improve the value of subsidy. However, in competi- tive industries, the behavior of saving non-SOEs in emergency can improve the value of subsidy. In addition, this study also finds that during the financial crisis, the government is more likely to save firms in poverty. The results help us understand more profoundly the mechanism of governmental subsidies given to firms and their economic consequences, and therefore, provide empirical evidence of how to allocate the resources of subsidies

关 键 词：政府补贴 产权性质 救穷行为 救急行为 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理] F812.4[经济管理—国民经济]