大股东控制、机构投资者持股与盈余管理  

Control of Largest Shareholder,Institutional Investors and Earnings Management

作　　者：孙光国[1,2] 刘爽 赵健宇[4] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院 [2]东北财经大学中国内部控制研究中心 [3]普华永道中天会计师事务所大连分所 [4]北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2015年第5期75-84,共10页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272051);教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(NCET-13-0707)资助

摘　　要：本文利用我国A股上市公司2009-2012年的数据,从应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理两个方面分析机构投资者持股对盈余管理的影响,并结合我国上市公司"一股独大"的实际情况,采用分组检验方法进一步验证了大股东控制对二者作用机制的影响。研究发现,上市公司机构投资者持股比例同盈余管理程度呈显著的负相关性;在将样本依据控股股东持股比例分组后,这种负相关性在大股东非绝对控制组中仍然成立,而在绝对控制组中则不成立;进一步检验发现,机构投资者持股对真实活动盈余管理的抑制作用在非国有上市公司中更为显著。Earnings management is one of the most important issues in financial accounting studies, and numerous articles investigate the different ways to monitor managers＇ earnings manipulation activities. In this study, we analyze the monitoring effect of institutional inves- tors on earnings management based on ＇A-share＇ listed companies＇ data from 2009 to 2012. On one hand, as the important outside share-holders, institutional investors have the ability and the motivation to monitor managers and avoid earning management. On the other hand, some papers suggest Chinese institutional investors pay more on short-term interest and do not care the long-term benefit of firms. So, whether institutional investors＇ ownership can avoid earnings management is still a myth in China. Considering the reality that the largest shareholder of Chinese companies takes dominant position, we further investigate whether the control of the largest shareholder will affect the institutional investors＇ behavior using grouping test. Through theoretical analysis and empirical testing, we find the fol- lowing conclusions： the shareholding ratios of institutional investors are negatively associated with earnings management, whether ac- crual earnings management or real earnings management activities. However, in the absolute control of the largest shareholder sample, the impact of institutional investors on accrual management and real earnings management is no longer significant. We contribute to the literature mainly on two respects. Firstly, we investigate the moder- ating effect of the largest shareholder ownership on the relationship between institutional investors and earnings management. Then, we measure earnings management on both accruals manipulation and real activities manipulation, and tutional investors on both sides find the monitoring effect of insti- The empirical findings show that as an important way of outside governance, institutional investors can avoid companies＇ earnings management. However, the over-con- centra

关 键 词：机构投资者持股 应计项目盈余管理 真实 活动盈余管理 大股东控制 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]