From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion  

作　　者：Michael Slote 

机构地区：[1]Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-4670, USA

出　　处：《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2015年第3期430-443,共14页中国哲学前沿（英文版）

摘　　要：Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.

关 键 词：ALTRUISM EGOISM EMOTION expansion FREEDOM human lives neutral motives SPONTANEITY VIRTUE 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学] B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]