风险厌恶下基于收入共享契约的供应链协调策略  

A Research of Supply Chain Coordination Strategy Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract under Risk-Aversion

作　　者：陈卫华[1,2] 李凯[1] 苑红涛 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004 [2]沈阳华晨宝马汽车有限公司,辽宁沈阳110143

出　　处：《工业工程》2015年第5期74-80,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172150;71472032)

摘　　要：在收入共享契约下,借助条件风险值理论研究风险规避零售商和风险中性供应商组成的二级供应链协调定价模型,推导出随机需求受价格影响的零售商最优零售价格、库存因子以及供应商最优批发价格。讨论风险规避系数、市场弹性系数和收入共享系数对分散供应链系统以及各成员运作绩效的影响。最后,进行数值算例,数值结果表明,随着零售商风险规避程度的增加,零售商和供应商运作绩效呈递减趋势,但采用收入共享契约可以有效的减少供应链系统以及各成员独立运作的绩效损失;当收入共享系数一定时,需求价格弹性系数越大,供应商和零售商运作绩效越小;然而零售商和供应商运作绩效并不受成本比例系数的影响。The pricing coordination model of the two-stage supply chain with a risk-aversion retailer and a risk-neutral supplier under revenue-sharing contract by using conditional value-at-risk is studied. The optical price-dependent demand and stocking factor of a retailer and the optical wholesale price of a supplier are derived. The decentralized supply chain and members＂ operation performances are discussed under risk-aversion and demand price elasticity and revenue-sharing coefficients. At last, a numerical calculation is conducted. The results show that with the increase of degree of retailers＂ risk-aversion, retailers＂ operation performances and suppliers＂ operation performances show a trend of declining. But the revenue-sharing contract can effectively reduce the supply chain system and members＂ performance losses. When revenue-sharing coefficient is unchanged, with the increase of demand price elasticity coefficient, the operation performances of retailers and suppliers will reduce. But cost ratio coefficient does not have impact on both suppliers＂ and retailers＂ performances.

关 键 词：收入共享契约 条件风险值 需求价格弹性系数 库存因子 成本比例系数 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]