中国地方政府环境规制激励机制研究  

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Chinese Local Government Environmental Regulation

作　　者：潘峰[1] 西宝[2] 王琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院 [2]大连理工大学公共管理与法学学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2015年第6期26-36,共11页China Economic Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AGL010);国家自然科学基金项目(61074133)的资助

摘　　要：针对环境规制中中央政府与地方政府之间的委托代理关系,通过构建多任务委托-代理模型,给出了中央政府激励地方政府的最优契约形式,考察了最优激励契约设计的影响因素,着重分析了环境规制相关因素对最优激励契约的影响。研究结果表明,中央政府对经济增长的重视度、中央政府对环境质量的重视度、地方政府的风险偏好、地方政府的经济发展能力、经济增长方差、污染减排量方差、环境规制执行成本以及环境规制经济成本都会影响最优激励契约的确立。中央政府应根据自身对经济增长和环境质量的重视程度,结合地方政府的不同属性,确立或调整最优激励方案。For the principal-agent relationship between local government and central government in environmental regula- tion, the optimal incentive contract and the influencing factors are given through establishing muhitask principal-agent model. The influence of optimal incentive contract from related factors of environmental regulation is analyzed based on the muhitask principal-agent model. The results show that the optimal incentive contract is affected by the degree of central government＇s at- tention on economic growth and environmental quality, the risk preference of local government, the economic development abil- ity of local government, the variance of economic growth, the variance of emission reductions, the implementing cost of envi- ronmental regulation and the economic cost of environmental regulation. The establishment and adjustment of optimal incentive contract should be according to the degree of central government＇s attention and the attribute of different local government.

关 键 词：环境规制 激励机制 多任务委托-代理 地方政府 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程] D630[政治法律—政治学]