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出 处:《保险研究》2015年第10期3-22,共20页Insurance Studies
摘 要:企业风险治理机制是通过一定的风险治理手段或风险管理策略合理规制剩余索取权和控制权的安排和调整,以使企业内的不同利益主体特别是股东(委托人)和管理层(代理人)形成有效的自我约束和激励机制。以管理层激励和风险管理策略为核心的风险治理机制对公司价值的影响效应是企业风险管理理论和实践的重大课题。本文以中国2007~2011年间的金融类上市公司作为研究样本,运用联立方程组控制主要变量之间的内生性问题,实证检验了风险治理机制中风险管理策略和管理层激励对公司价值的影响作用和互补效应。考虑控制人属性的影响,风险管理策略和管理层激励的互补效应在国有企业和非国有企业中有所差异,表明不同性质企业的风险治理对公司价值的影响效应存在明显差别。Enterprise risk governance mechanisms are methods that make different stakeholders within the compa- ny, especially shareholders (principals) and management (agent), form an effective self-restraint and ineentivizing mechanism through the reasonable regulation of the arrangement and adjustment of residual claims and control right by certain risk governance means or risk management strategy. The effect of risk governance mechanismson corpo- rate value, whose core is management incentives and risk management strategy, should be a major topic of enterprise risk management theory and practices. This article used financial listed companies in China from 2007 to 2011 as research samples, employed simultaneous equations to control the endogenity between main variables, and empirical- ly tested the influence and complementary effects of risk management strategy and management incentive plans in risk governance mechanisms on corporate value. In consideration of the controller's attributes,there are differences between the complementary effects of risk management strategy and management incentive plans of state-owned en- terprises and non-state-owned enterprises, which showed that there are significant differences in the effect of risk governance on corporate value in different kinds of companies.
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