财务总监激励与上市公司会计信息质量  

On Incentives to CFO and Quality of Accounting Information of Listed Companies

作　　者：潘亚岚[1] 凌欧 

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《杭州电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第5期20-26,共7页Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University：Social Sciences

摘　　要：财务总监是企业会计系统的主导者,那么对财务总监激励是否有助于提高会计信息质量?文章以2012-2014年深圳证券交易所主板A股上市公司为研究对象,从薪酬激励、股权激励和控制权激励三个方面系统分析了财务总监激励对会计信息质量的影响。实证结果表明,财务总监激励有助于提高会计信息质量,授予财务总监一定的薪酬激励和股权激励能有效提升会计信息质量,而控制权激励的影响并不显著;为满足投资者决策的信息需求,应利用财务总监激励对会计信息质量的正向作用,进一步提高会计信息决策有用性。The CFO is the leader of a company＇s accounting system. Can the quality of accounting information be improved while the CFO is stimulated？ In this paper,the Chinese listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board from 2012 to 2014 are chosen as a sample range,which is applied to analyze systematically how much the influence of the incentive to the CFO on the quality of the accounting information from the following three aspects is： the remuneration incentive,the stock equity incentive and the control power incentive. It shows that there is a positive correlation between the incentive to the CFO and the quality of accounting information. Granting the remuneration incentive and the stock equity incentive to the CFO can improve the quality of the accounting information effectively,but the impact of the control power incentive is not significant. In order to satisfy the information demand of investors,the stockholders should make good use of the positive influence of the incentive to the CFO on the quality of the accounting information so as to further improve the serviceability of it.

关 键 词：财务总监 薪酬激励 股权激励 控制权激励 会计信息质量 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学]