需求扰动和联合促销下双渠道供应链的竞争与协调  

Competing and Coordination Strategies for Dual-channel Supply Chain with Demand Disruption and Cooperative Promotion

作　　者：彭静[1,2] 林杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]浙江农林大学信息工程学院,浙江临安311300

出　　处：《预测》2015年第6期62-68,共7页Forecasting

摘　　要：针对由制造商拥有的电子直销渠道和传统零售渠道组成的双渠道供应链系统,在需求发生扰动和联合促销情况下,对制造商和零售商之间的竞争和协调问题进行研究。通过求解优化问题的Kuhn-Tucker条件,分别给出无需求扰动和发生需求扰动时集中式双渠道供应链系统的最优定价、生产决策和联合促销投资水平,并提出促销补贴契约以协调需求扰动时的分散式双渠道供应链系统。结果表明需求扰动的大小和消费者对电子渠道的接受程度对双渠道供应链系统的最优决策和协调契约有着重要影响,另外需求扰动量的变化幅度越大,采取调整策略前后的利润差异越大,最后通过数值分析验证了模型的有效性。The pricing competing and channel coordination strategies in a one-manufacturer-one-retailer dual channel supply chain with demand disruptions and cooperative promotion are studied. By solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of optimization problem, the centralized dual-channel supply chain＇ s optimal pricing, production decisions and cooperative promotion investment level are obtained under regular operation and demand disruptions, respectively. Moreover, a promotion subsidy contract to coordinate the decentralized dual-channel supply chain with demand disruptions and coop- eration promotion is presented. It is found that different demand disruption scenarios and consumer acceptance of e- channel scenarios have significant effects on the dual-channel supply chain＇ s optimal decisions and coordination mecha- nism, moreover, the greater the magnitude of variation in demand disruption is, the greater the profit differential of taking adjusted strategies is. Finally, numerical examples are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the model.

关 键 词：双渠道 扰动管理 联合促销 协调 博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]