基于期权博弈的PPP项目特许权期决策模型  

Concession Period Decision Models for Public Private Partnership Based on Option Games

作　　者：王治[1] 谭欢[2] 王靖[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410114 [2]广东科技学院财经系,广东东莞523000

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2015年第6期58-63,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(10CGL063);湖南省教育厅重点项目(14A008);现代服务业发展与湖南新型城镇化协同创新中心资助的阶段性成果

摘　　要：运用期权博弈方法,从无政府担保基本情形出发,构建PPP项目特许权期决策模型,考量政府参与风险分担对特许权期的影响。结果表明,收益波动率一定的情况下,特许权期随着政府最低收益担保期望价值的增加而减少;而在政府最低收益担保期望价值一定的情况下,特许权期随着收益波动率的增加而增加。鉴此,政府应根据项目的风险收益情况实施弹性特许权期制。This paper, taking the government investment and sharing risks into consideration, manages to seek out concession period decision models for Public Private Partnership with option game theory, studies the influence of government investment on concession period and demon- strates the above-mentioned models in the Guangshen highway. The result shows that when earn- ings volatility was stable, concession period reduced with the increase of the lowest income expec- tation value, while under certain lowest income expectation value of government, concession peri- od increased with the increase of earnings volatility. Still, the paper puts forward the argument that the government shall implement flexible concession period in accordance with the specific cir- cumstances of Public Private Partnership.

关 键 词：PPP项目 特许权期 期权博弈 政府担保 

分 类 号：F282[经济管理—国民经济]