尼采与后期维特根斯坦论真理  

Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein on Truth

作　　者：朱彦明[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学哲学系,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2015年第6期13-18,共6页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

摘　　要：尼采与后期维特根斯坦都挑战了传统形而上学真理观或真理符合论,驳斥了我们的信念的以及真或假判断的形而上学基础。他们并非否定了真理的可能性,而是认为真理都是语境相关的。在此方面,他们之间可以说是遥相呼应、殊途同归。尼采将我们的真或假的判断,看成是与生命的保存和提高的条件相关的;后期维特根斯坦则将真理的语境条件追溯到我们共同的生活形式上。但是,尼采重估一切价值的怀疑精神,以个人趣味的真理创造和冒险,挑战了大众标准的真理观念;后期维特根斯坦最终思考了知识和真理的不可怀疑的基础即确实性问题,并将习俗、制度、共同行为以及继承下来的文化知识背景等构成的生活形式看成是既定的前提。所以,从哲学风格上看,尼采比后期维特根斯坦更有批判性。当然,在这个方面,他也是极端的。Nietzsche and later Wittgenstein challenged theory, did away with the metaphysical foundation on the traditional metaphysical view of truth or correspondence which our basic belief and judgments are based. Neverthe- less, they did not deny truth at all, but only regarded it as context-dependent instead. Echoing with each other they attained the same aim through different approaches. In this respect, Nietzsche saw our judgments （ either true or false ） as the condition of life preservation and promotion, and later Wittgenstein traced the context of truth to our common life form. Nietzsche, in his sceptical mood, rejected popular truth. Wittgenstein in his late years thought of the credible foundation of our knowledge and truth as certainty and saw the life form as a given precondition, which is manifested by our convention, system, shared deeds, inherited cultural condition, etc. Therefore, in phil- osophical style, Nietzsche is more critical than Wittgenstein. Of course, in this way, Nietzsche also goes to ex- tremes.

关 键 词：真理 语境 语言游戏 确定性 符合论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]