我国管理层持股对公司业绩的影响研究——基于产品市场竞争的视角  

A Study on the Influence of Managerial Share-holding on Corporate Performance——From the Perspective of Product Market Competition

作　　者：李辉[1] 王聪[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《西安石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第6期18-24,共7页Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12CJL005);陕西省社会科学基金项目(2014D02);陕西省教育厅基金项目(14JK1705);西北大学2013年度科研基金人文社科类项目(13NW16)

摘　　要：以往考察管理层持股与公司业绩的研究均没有考虑产品市场竞争程度的影响,而超产权理论认为,产品市场竞争是公司业绩改善的根本保证。为此,通过构建动态面板数据模型,采用DIF-GMM估计方法,以我国沪、深两市2011—2014年的A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨了产品市场竞争对管理层持股与公司业绩的影响。研究发现:产品市场竞争对管理层持股的激励效果具有显著影响,产品市场竞争程度越高,管理层持股的激励效果越好;产品市场竞争程度越低,管理层持股的激励效果越差。The previous researches on managerial stockholding share and corporate performance both did not consider the influence of product market competition. But from the point of beyond principal agent theory, product market competition is the fundamental guarantee of corporate performance improvement. Constructing a dynamic panel data model and adopting DIF - GMM estimation method, the paper researched the effect of product market competition on relationship between managerial stockholding and corporate performance by Chi- nese A - share listed companies from 2011 to 2014. It is found out that product market competition affects the incentive effect of managerial stockholding share. The higher the level of product market competition, the better the incentive effect. The lower the level of product market competition, the worse the incentive effect.

关 键 词：产品市场竞争 管理层持股 公司业绩 超产权理论 HHI指数 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]