动态声明博弈下的知识流程外包质量激励  

Quality Incentives for Knowledge Process Outsourcing under Dynamic Cheap-talk Game

作　　者：欧阳智[1,2] 苏秦[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院 [2]机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第23期136-141,共6页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目“面向经济、社会和环境协调发展的现代物流管理研究”(71390330);国家自然科学基金面上项目“3D打印的制造模式创新研究:社会变革视角”(71371151);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“我国重大装备产品质量竞争力提升途径研究”(13YJA630078)

摘　　要：知识流程外包近年来获得了巨大的发展,但关于其具体运营问题却很少关注。通过强调知识结果的不易测量性,指出知识流程外包利用传统的外包契约将导致较低的外包绩效。通过从长期动态结构中引入一个几乎不计成本的声明,试图解决不可契约部分质量低下的问题。结论指出,知识流程外包必须从长期战略出发,不仅需要更完善的正式契约,还需要加强与外包双方的互惠和信任关系,并且提升对知识结果质量的评估、考评和关注的能力建设,以实现知识流程外包的服务质量激励。Knowledge Process Outsourcing has enjoyed great growth recently, but scarce attention in literature is put into its operation. Due to the difficulty in measuring the knowledge performance, it is suggested that adoption of conventional outsourcing contracts in Knowledge Process Outsourcing leads to poor results. This paper attempts to solve the problem about poor service qualities under KPO context with introduction of almost zero - cost Cheap - talk into a long - term dynamic game - theoretical structure. The conclusions emphasize that, Knowledge Process Outsourcing needs to be oriented in long - term strategy, which requires not only more complete formal contract but also reinforced reciprocal and trustful relationship between both outsourcing parties. It also points out the significance of promoting the dynamic capabilities about assessment, inspection and awareness of knowledge service quality.

关 键 词：知识流程外包 服务质量 声明博弈 关系契约 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]