投资机会集、内部控制与真实活动盈余管理  

Investment Opportunity Set,Internal Control and Real Earnings Management

作　　者：林钟高[1] 孙丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学商学院,安徽马鞍山243002

出　　处：《南京审计学院学报》2015年第6期55-64,共10页journal of nanjing audit university

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272220;71402001;71572002)

摘　　要：以2007—2012年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验投资机会集、内部控制以及两者交互作用对真实活动盈余管理的影响,结果显示:随着投资机会集的增加,上市公司真实活动盈余管理的动机将显著减弱;加入内部控制治理机制之后,随着投资机会集的增加,高质量的内部控制使得上市公司真实活动盈余管理的动机更弱;在进一步加入市场化进程和产权属性之后,投资机会集与内部控制的交互作用对真实活动盈余管理动机的影响只在市场化程度高的地区显著,并且这一效应只在国有上市公司中显著存在。Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 as samples,this paper makes an empirical research on the influence of inspect investment opportunity set,internal control and their interaction on real earnings management. The results show that the motivation of real earnings management will significantly diminish with the increase of investment opportunity set. Taking the effect of internal control mechanism into account,the inhibitory effect is more obviously. After the process of marketization and property rights,the influence of the interaction between the investment opportunity set and the internal control on real earnings management is significant,especially in the areas with high process of marketization and the stateowned companies.

关 键 词：投资机会集 内部控制 真实活动盈余管理 市场化进程 应计盈余管理 经营现金流量 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]