基于完全信息静态博弈的农产品质量监管策略分析  

Strategic Analysis of Monitoring the Quality of Agricultural Products Based on Complete Information Static Game Theory

作　　者：王术[1] 周文良[1] 王斌会[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广州510642 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广州510632

出　　处：《湖北农业科学》2015年第21期5439-5443,共5页Hubei Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：华南农业大学2015年国家级大学生创新创业训练计划项目(201510564389)

摘　　要：应用博弈论中的完全信息静态博弈模型研究农产品质量安全监管问题,通过分析农产品检测人员和农产品供应人员的具体行为得到混合策略下的纳什均衡点,得出了在考虑检查成本时检测人员抽检农产品的概率与供应人员供应合格的农产品概率之间的关系。研究表明,经济博弈方对收入、成本和罚款的预期是决定两者策略选择的重要因素,并提出提高农产品质量的措施。By using the complete information static game, the quality-safety surveillance of agricultural products was studied, and the Nash equilibrium under the mixed strategy was grasped by analyzing the behavior of the inspectors and suppliers of agricultural products. The relationship between possibility of inspectors’ sampling agricultural products and possibility of suppli-ers’ qualifying agricultural products under considering the check cost was found out. The research showed that, the expecta-tion for income, cost and fine are crucial for both game parties when they choose the strategy. Finally some countermeasures to improve the quality of agricultural products were proposed.

关 键 词：农产品 质量监管 完全信息静态博弈 

分 类 号：F326.5[经济管理—产业经济] TS207.7[轻工技术与工程—食品科学]