企业技术创新行为的演化博弈及对种业创新困境的解释  

Evolutionary Gaming of Companies' Technological Innovation Behavior and the Analysis on the Plight of Seed Industry Innovation

作　　者：张哲[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第24期158-164,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

摘　　要：鉴于我国种业发展存在创新水平低、"套牌"和假冒伪劣产品充斥市场等问题,利用演化博弈理论的方法,对我国种业创新企业的创新行为进行演化博弈分析,并对我国种业创新困境进行解释,主要结论如下,知识产权保护制度不完善导致"柠檬市场";种业市场虚假繁荣下面临技术扩散约束;低市场集中度约束了模仿企业创新投入和市场定价能力;消费者偏好保守不利于种业企业创新的增加;企业的短见对种业创新产生约束。As China＇s seed industry is under low level innovation,and counterfeit products are prevailing,this paper analyzed the firms＇ innovation behaviors and used Evolutionary Game Theory to predict the factors influencing companies group innovation behavior so as to analyze the innovation dilemma. The conclusions are as follows： firstly,imperfect intellectual property protection system leads to ＂Lemon Market＂; secondly,technology diffusion is constrained under false prosperity market; thirdly,low market concentration constrains the imitative innovation companies＇ RD investment and pricing ability; fourthly,consumers ＇ risk avoidance preference negatively influences the companies ＇ innovation; finally,shortsighted companies constrain the industry innovation.

关 键 词：原始创新 模仿 演化博弈 种业 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]