零售商双渠道供应链定价及协调研究  

On pricing and coordination strategy of retailers' dual channel supply chain

作　　者：仲凯旋 巩永华[1] 薛殿中 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学管理学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《南京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第4期46-51,90,共7页Journal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金"ICT促进行业减排激励政策研究"(2012SJB630049);南京邮电大学引进人才基金"电信基础设施共建共享激励与协调机制研究"(NYS211011)

摘　　要：研究了零售商双渠道供应链的定价策略和协调问题,建立制造商和零售商两方博弈模型,分析了集中决策和分散决策两种情境下的定价决策均衡解,并设计收入共享契约来解决零售商双渠道存在的双重边际化效应。结果表明,零售商需要提供合理的收入分配比例才能实现供应链各成员利润的Pareto改进,并最终协调整个双渠道供应链。在双渠道竞争环境下,线上线下不能采取完全同价策略,企业应针对不同渠道的具体情况制定不同的销售价格。This paper studies pricing and coordination issues in retailers＇ dual channel supply chain, and establishes a two-party game model between manufacturers and retailers. Pricing strategies under centralized and de- centralized decision-making are analyzed. On this basis, Revenue Share Contract is designed to alleviate channel conflict. The results indicate that it is necessary for retailers to offer proper revenue allocation proportion in order to achieve Pareto improvement in profits and coordinate entire dual channel supply chain. Under the environment of dual channel competition, there is a certain difference in the prices of online ＆ offline. Enterprises should develop different sales prices for different channels in the specific situation.

关 键 词：零售商双渠道 定价决策 供应链 收入共享契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]