管理者任期、晋升激励与多元化决策研究  

Research on Management Tenure, Promotion Incentive and Diversification Decisions

作　　者：刘亚伟[1] 郑宝红[2] 吴伟荣[3] 

机构地区：[1]中南民族大学管理学院会计系 [2]华中科技大学管理学院会计系 [3]华中农业大学经济管理学院会计系

出　　处：《投资研究》2015年第9期61-75,共15页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(项目号:71102168)的资助

摘　　要：本文运用高层梯队理论和心理契约理论,从管理者任期的角度,对晋升如何影响多元化决策进行了理论分析和实证检验。结果发现:晋升对多元化决策有一定抑制作用;随着既有任期的增加,管理者对晋升激励的敏感性以及晋升激励对多元化决策的抑制作用都会增强;但管理者对晋升激励的敏感性以及晋升激励对多元化决策的抑制作用并不受其预期任期的影响。进一步区分产权性质发现,上述现象在国有和非国有公司中存在显著差异。This paper employs Upper Echelons Theory and Psychological Contract Theory to investigate promotion how to influ- ence the diversification decision through Theoretical and Empirical Analysis from the point of view of tenure of managers. These results demonstrate that the promotion has certain inhibitory effect on diversification decision; with actual tenure increases, promo- tion incentives sensitivity of managers and promotion incentives inhibitory effect on diversification decisions will be enhanced; however, the promotion incentives sensitivity of managers and promotion incentives inhibitory effect on diversification decisions is not affected by the expected tenure. Furthermore, it is found that managers with different tenure show different promotion sensitivi- ty and different effects on the inhibition of promotion to diversification decisions when considering distinction on property rights.

关 键 词：既有任期 预期任期 晋升激励 多元化决策 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]