寡头竞争中企业跨渠道交叉销售的协调问题  

Coordination of the Enterprises' Cross-selling among Multiple Channels under Oligopolistic Competition

作　　者：宋昕帅[1] 顾锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2015年第6期874-880,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70932004)

摘　　要：跨渠道的交叉销售指不同营销渠道的负责部门基于客户关系,进行横向推荐产品或业务的模式。作为提高客户价值的有效手段,当前在金融业已得到广泛应用,并在部分制造型企业采用。波士顿咨询公司指出有效的战略与管理是交叉销售成功的关键之一,但企业实践中各方冲突较多,而现有研究对此却较少涉及。讨论了交叉销售中,因不同部门对服务因素的争议导致的利益协调问题。建立了单个企业内部独立决策、议价两种模式的博弈模型,并引入议价能力,提出部门独立决策条件下,利用内部转移价格与服务补偿手段,能够实现整体利益最大化;进一步,认为寡头竞争中,不同的转移价格与部门间议价能力影响了企业最优策略。Cross-selling among multiple channels refers to the horizontal referrals of business or products based on customer relationship between departments responsible for different channels in the same company.As an effective method to increase customer value,it has been broadly applied in financial and part of manufacturing industries.The Boston Consulting Group regards effective strategy and management as the key factor of successful cross-selling.However,companies are facing various conflicts in practice,and there is relatively few research on this problem.This paper discusses the profit coordination problem caused by argument on services among departments responsible for different channels in the process of cross-selling.Game theoretic models of individual decision-making modes and bargain modes between departments in single enterprise are established,taking into consideration of the bargain power.The result shows that applying internal transfer price and service compensation could optimize the single enterprise＇s total profit.The enterprises＇ internal coordinating strategy under oligopolistic competition is analyzed.The result shows that different transfer price and department bargain power affect the optimal strategy.

关 键 词：交叉销售 内部协调 跨渠道 服务 内部转移价格 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]