不完全信息下供应链组合激励机制研究  

Study on Supply Chain Combined Motivation Mechanism under Incomplete Information

作　　者：李福星[1] 谢铁军[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《物流技术》2015年第21期150-154,共5页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：针对不完全信息下两级供应链的组合激励机制进行了研究。首先,对完全信息下供应链处于集中与分散两种模式进行了博弈分析。其次,设计出不完全信息下两种激励机制模型,通过改进最优控制理论中的变分法求解出激励机制模型。最后,通过数值仿真,验证了两种激励机制模型均能够实现供应链整体绩效的帕累托改善。In this paper, we studied the combined motivation mechanism of a two-echelon supply chain with incomplete information. First we had a game analysis of the supply chain with complete information when it was of the centralized and distributive modes respectively, then designed the model of the two motivation mechanisms under incomplete information, and at the end, through a numerical simulation, demonstrated that both motivation mechanism could realize the Pareto improvement of the supply chain.

关 键 词：不完全信息 供应链 销售努力 组合激励机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]