企业反倾销应诉与政府激励机制研究——基于演化博弈的分析  

A Study of Enterprises' Response to Antidumping Actions and Government Incentive Mechanism— An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：任志成[1] 刘梦[1] 刘杨[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院经济与贸易学院,江苏南京211815 [2]南京审计学院公共经济学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2016年第1期106-111,共6页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BJY119);江苏省高校人文社会科学研究项目(2015ZDIXM022);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2014SJD149)

摘　　要：近年来,面对我国企业在海外遭受的众多反倾销诉讼,政府采取了大量积极的措施,但政策有效性值得商榷。文章基于演化博弈视角分析企业在海外的应诉利益博弈,提出了最符合可持续发展战略的企业策略均衡。在此基础上,通过仿真模拟,得出以下结论:声誉与损失溢价会影响企业的决策路径;政府单纯的补贴政策是低效率的;补贴与惩罚并行的机制是政府激励企业积极应诉的最优途径,且政府的激励力度需达到企业群体改变决策的临界点。In recent years,the Chinese government has taken a number of positive measures to cope with the numerous over-seas antidumping lawsuits against Chinese enterprises,but the effectiveness of the policy is debatable. The paper,based onthe perspective of evolutionary game,analyzes enterprises＇ overseas respondent benefit gambling,and puts forth the enter-prise strategy equilibrium in the most consistent with sustainable development strategy. On this basis,the paper draws the fol-lowing conclusions by simulation：the reputation and the loss premium will affect corporate decision-making path;govern-ment subsidy policy alone is inefficient;the parallel mechanism of subsidies and punishments is the best way for governmentto encourage enterprises to actively respond to lawsuits,and the government incentive strength need to reach the threshold atwhich enterprise groups change their decisions.

关 键 词：演化博弈 损失溢价 声誉 政府激励机制 

分 类 号：F271.3[经济管理—企业管理] F752.02[经济管理—国民经济]