终极股东超额控制下公司治理环境与股权结构的价值效应研究  

Value Effects of Corporate Governance Environment and Ownership Structure under the Exceeding Control of Ultimate Shareholder

作　　者：周建[1,2,3] 余耀东[1,2] 杨帅[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [3]南开大学滨海学院,天津300270

出　　处：《数理统计与管理》2016年第1期162-178,共17页Journal of Applied Statistics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272184;70872048);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-08-0302);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(11JJD630005);南开大学"985工程"中国企业管理与制度创新基地资助项目(1050821210)

摘　　要：公司治理环境和股权结构分别是从公司外部宏观层面和内部微观层面影响公司价值的两类主要因素。在上市公司终极股东普遍存在超额控制权的现实背景下,本文基于终极股东超额控制权中介效应的视角,利用中国上市公司的大样本经验数据和结构方程模型的数理统计方法,实证研究了公司治理环境和股权结构对公司价值的影响机制。研究发现,终极股东的超额控制权会显著损害上市公司价值;公司治理环境和股权制衡基本不具有直接的价值创造效应,但可以通过抑制终极股东的超额控制权进而间接具有价值创造效应;股权集中具有显著的直接价值创造效应,虽然股权集中会促进终极股东的超额控制权从而具有间接的价值损害效应,但大股东与上市公司的利益趋同大于对上市公司的利益侵占,使得股权集中的总价值效应仍表现为价值创造效应。结论表明,通过遏制终极股东的超额控制权,能够有效实现公司治理环境和股权结构的价值创造功能。The corporate governance environment and ownership structure are two main types of factors that affect corporate value respectively from the external macro-level and internal micro-level. In the realistic background that the ultimate shareholders of public listed companies generally have exceeding control rights, based on the perspective of mediating effect of the exceeding control right of ultimate shareholder, using the large empirical data of China＇s public listed companies sample and the mathe- matical statistics method of struct^lral equation model, the impact mechanism of corporate governance environment and ownership structure on corporate value is studied in the paper. We find that the ex- ceeding control right of ultimate shareholder significantly impairs the value of public listed company. The corporate governance environment and equity balance do not have direct value creation effects on the whole, but they can produce indirect value creation effects by restraining the exceeding control right of ultimate shareholder. Ownership concentration has significantly direct value creation effect, although the ownership concentration impairs the corporate value by promoting the exceeding control right of ultimate shareholder, the interest convergence of major shareholders is greater than the interest expropriation of them, so that the total value effect of ownership concentration is shown as value creation effect. The results show that the functions of both corporate governance environment and ownership structure can be realized by restraining the exceeding control right of ultimate shareholder.

关 键 词：公司治理环境 股权结构 超额控制权 价值效应 结构方程模型 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理] O212[经济管理—国民经济]