多任务委托代理关系下的导游服务外包激励机制研究  

Researches of Incentive Mechanism for Tour Guide Service Outsourcing under Multi-task Principal-agent Relationship

作　　者：鲁芳[1] 章江顺 王丹丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学管理科学与工程研究所,株洲412008

出　　处：《世界科技研究与发展》2015年第6期740-745,共6页World Sci-Tech R&D

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71201053);湖南省教育厅科研优秀青年项目(15B070)资助

摘　　要：由于导游服务外包实践中的信息非对称性问题,旅行社无法正常观测到导游服务商在提高经济效益及服务质量任务上的努力程度。为此,借助委托代理的理论分析框架,设计多任务委托代理关系下的导游服务外包激励机制模型。运用最优化原理与数值仿真,分析信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下的导游服务外包激励参数、导游服务商在各项任务上的努力程度及代理成本问题。研究表明:在信息不对称下,当两项任务的风险程度不相同时,旅行社对导游服务商在各个任务上应进行有区别的激励;代理成本与两项任务的风险程度呈正相关关系。Considering the problem of information asymmetry in the practicing of tour guide service outsourcing, travel agency can＇t observe tour guide service provider＇s real effort levels of enhancing economic benefits and service quality. To solve this problem, the principal-agent theory is applied to design tour guide service outsourcing contract under multi-task princi- ple-agent relationship. In two eases of symmetric information and asymmetric information, the incentive parameters of tour guide service outsoureing,the service provider＇s effort level of the two tasks and agency costs are analyzed by the optimization theory and the numerical simulation. The result shows that the travel agency should give the tour guide service provider differentiated incentives, when the information is asymmetric and the risk level of two tasks is different. And the agency cost is positively correlated with the risk level of two tasks.

关 键 词：导游服务外包 激励机制 多任务 委托-代理关系 

分 类 号：F592.6[经济管理—旅游管理]