制造成本扰动下链与链竞争的定价和生产决策  

Pricing and production decisions in chain-to-chain competition under production costs disruption

作　　者：何波[1] 张霞[1] 王娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2015年第12期3310-3318,共9页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71001111;71572021)~~

摘　　要：为解决突发事件引起的制造成本扰动对供应链企业产生的负面影响,研究了在制造成本扰动下两条竞争供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型,比较了有无制造成本扰动两种情形下两条竞争供应链的价格和订货策略,讨论了成本扰动对两条供应链的最优定价、订货策略和利润的影响,分析了不同成本扰动范围下两条供应链的最优调整策略。研究发现,只有当扰动成本超过一定阈值时,调整订货和定价策略才是占优策略,并得出了成本扰动的鲁棒范围。通过比较成本扰动发生后调整和不调整情况下供应链的利润,研究了进行策略调整的价值。通过数值分析验证了相关结论。To solve the influence of cost disruption caused by emergency events on the whole supply chain,a Stackelberg game model consisted of two competition supply chains under production cost disruptions was researched.The pricing and ordering policy of two supply chains in the cases with and without production cost disruption was compared.The impact of production cost disruption on optimal pricing,production quantity decision and resulting profits for both supply chains was discussed,and the optimal adjustment strategy of two supply chains under different cost disruption was analyzed.The research showed that if disruption cost fall into a certain interval,the optimal decisions for the supply chains should be kept the same as the decisions under the normal situation,and if the disruption cost beyond the interval,it was beneficial for the supply chains to change their pricing and production decisions respectively according to the adjustment strategies.The conclusions were verified through numerical computations.

关 键 词：供应链管理 链与链竞争 制造成本扰动 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]