忙碌董事对企业绩效影响研究——基于监督与咨询的二元视角  

Research on the Consequence of Busy Directors on Firms' Performance——Based on Dual Perspectives of Supervision and Advisory

作　　者：段海艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南科技大学管理学院,河南洛阳471000

出　　处：《软科学》2016年第1期61-65,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(U1204704/G0202);2013年河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划项目;河南省高等学校哲学社会科学优秀学者项目(2014-YXXZ-17);河南高校青年骨干教师资助计划项目(2011GGJS-077)

摘　　要：以我国中小板上市公司为样本,就忙碌董事对董事会监督、咨询效率以及企业绩效的影响进行实证检验。结果发现:忙碌董事与董事会监督效率负相关;忙碌董事与董事会咨询效率正相关,在投资不足企业更为显著;忙碌董事有利于"低监督成本、高咨询需求"企业绩效的改善,对"高监督成本、低咨询需求"企业绩效影响不具显著性。Taking small and medium-sized listed companies as example,this paper empirically analyzes how busy directors influence board supervisory efficiency,advisory efficiency and firm performance. Result shows that busy directors have negative influence on board supervisory efficiency. Busy directors have positive influence on board advisory efficiency,which is especially significant for those under-investment companies. Busy directors may improve performance for companies of＂lowcost supervision,high demand for advisory＂,while have no significant effect on companies of ＂high-cost supervision,low demand for advisory＂.

关 键 词：忙碌董事 外部董事 董事会监督 董事会咨询 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F272[经济管理—国民经济]