大气环境治理演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Atmospheric Environmental Governance

作　　者：何为[1] 温丹辉[2] 孙振清[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]天津科技大学经济管理学院,天津300222

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2016年第1期I0001-I0004,共4页Urban Development Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(编号:12YJC790200);2015年天津市政府决策咨询重点课题(编号:ZFZX2015-18)

摘　　要：考察上级政府考核机制对地方政府和产污企业间演化博弈的策略稳定性影响。构建动态支付矩阵,建立演化博弈模型,讨论了围绕中心点的稳定演化策略并进行仿真模拟。主要研究结论是:以执法结果为导向的考核模式无法保证博弈策略趋于稳定;以环境质量为导向的考核模式有助于形成演化稳定策略,但前提是"环境管理效应系数"比较高,即地方政府努力程度对环境质量的改善贡献比较大。以环境治理过程为导向的考核模式中,累进惩罚制度将促进地方政府持续稳定地履行环境监管职责,从而达到演化博弈均衡。Effects of performance assessment mechanisms on evolutionary stability between local governments and enterprises are studied here. An evolutionary game model is established based on dynamic payoff matrixes, and evolutionarily stable strategies around the central point are discussed and simulated. Three main conclusions emerges： assessment mechanisms focused on amount of fines can＇t make out ESS; assessment mechanisms focused on environmental results are effective only if there are significant relationship between local governmental efforts and environmental outcomes; assessment mechanisms focused on progressive disciplinal rate will make out ESS.

关 键 词：环境治理 演化博弈 地方政府 考核 大气污染 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]