维修服务契约的最优设计和分析  

Optimal Design and Analysis of Maintenance Service Contract

作　　者：彭懿[1] 吴锦标[2] 

机构地区：[1]长沙师范学院初等教育系,长沙410100 [2]中南大学数学与统计学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《工程数学学报》2016年第1期17-24,共8页Chinese Journal of Engineering Mathematics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(11201489);湖南省教育厅科研项目(15C0100)~~

摘　　要：本文研究了一个带服务契约的机器维修模型.为了合理优化设计机器维修服务契约,本文利用多服务器排队系统理论对具有多台机器和多个修理工的机器维修模型进行分析,得到了每台机器产生的纯收益和代理商的纯收益期望值;利用非合作博弈论对维修服务契约进行分析,得到了最优保修期、保修费和修理工数目.我们发现最优保修期和修理工数目均与保修价格函数无关.而且,对于固定寿命的机器,机器总数几乎不影响最优保修期的设定.In this paper, we study a maintenance model with a given type of service contract. In order to study the optimal designing of machine maintenance contracts, this paper develops a multi-server queueing model to obtain the expected net incomes by each machine and the agent. Using a non-cooperative game formulation, we achieve the agent＇s optimal pricing strategy, the length of warranty and the number of repairmen. We find that the optimal length of warranty and the number of repairmen are independent of the warranty price functions. Furthermore, for fixed lifetime of the unit, the number of customers hardly affects the optimal length of warranty.

关 键 词：排队论 服务契约 博弈论 可靠性理论 

分 类 号：O226[理学—运筹学与控制论]